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The debate of the so-called “net neutrality” has been under the spotlight in the US for 
many years, whereas many believed it would not become an issue in Europe. 
However, over the past few months the need to revise the current regulatory 
framework to encourage investment in all-IP networks has led to greater attention 
for net neutrality and its consequences for investment and competition. After the 
Commission adopted a “light-touch” approach to the issue at the end of 2007, the 
European Parliament has started to reconsider the issue, and it is reportedly 
considering a move towards more pro-neutrality rules. This paper summarises the 
main issues at hand in the net neutrality debate and the views expressed by advocates 
and opponents of the neutrality principle. The problem is described from a multi-sided 
market perspective, stressing the role of network operators as intermediaries in the 
“layered” architecture of all-IP networks. Finally, the paper discusses whether the 
European regulatory framework and its interaction with ex post competition policy 
are likely to solve many of the concerns of net neutrality advocates without any need 
for ad hoc regulation; and whether currently proposed solutions are likely to prove 
welfare-enhancing and conducive to a better regulatory environment for future e-
communications. 
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Introduction: “Power to the people”? 
The net neutrality debate has been constantly under the spotlight in the US, 
where the quarrel between “openists” and “deregulationists” has become hectic 
and, often, reached peaks of unprecedented rhetoric1. Over the past few years, 
the term “net neutrality” has been given so many meanings and interpretations 
that, today, it is even hard to define precisely what is at stake in the debate, and 
why is net neutrality so important for the future of telecommunications policy2. 
Until recently, the main concern was that Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
especially when vertically integrated into the provision of services and 
applications such as VoIP, could manage to “close the door” to competing 
providers of applications and content in order to secure higher revenues. The 
technical term for “closing the door” is “blocking a port”, and this is what 
reportedly happened in 2004 in North Carolina, where a small DSL provider 
named Madison River decided to block the port to competing VoIP provider 
Vonage. After a consent decree with the FCC, Madison River had to pay a fine of 
$15,0003. However small and isolated this case was – no similar case has been 
decided since then – it proved sufficient to mount a huge fight over the 
imminent “end of the end-to-end” principle, on which the whole Internet 
Protocol is based4.  
The Madison River case paved the way for the emergence of a coalition of 
“openists”, according to which ISPs could have a strong incentive to transform 
the Internet – which they define as a network of “dumb pipes” with intelligence 
placed only at the edges, and no possibility to block or prioritize information 
packets flowing on it – into a more intelligent network, where not all bits are 
created equal5. Openists claim that ISPs could engage in other types of 
                                                   
1  Check, for example, www.savetheinternet.com and www.handsoff.com, two Internet websites 
that represent opposing views on net neutrality. 
2  According to US Senator Jim DeMint, net neutrality “has become a nebulous catchall for a 
number of competing public policy issues”. See Jim DeMint, Perspective: Why Net 
Neutrality Means More Federal Regulation, CNET NEWS.COM, Jun. 27, 2006, 
http://www.news.com/Why-Net-neutrality-meansmore-federal-regulation/2010-1028_3-
6088253.html 
3  See Madison River Communications, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). Decision available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf. 
4  See Lemley and Lessig (2001). 
5  By ISPs I refer to both network owners and operators that provide access to the Internet by 
relying on other operators’ networks.  
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undesirable behaviour: words such as “tiering”, traffic shaping, packet sniffing, 
charging for predefined quality of service (QoS), intentionally QoS degradation, 
and “walled gardens”6 have become widespread in the jargon of net neutrality 
spokesmen. The openists’ claim, in terms of policy, is quite clear and 
resounding: net neutrality should be made mandatory by an explicit regulatory 
requirement7, and this would at once save the Internet and give back “power to 
the people”.  
On the other hand, network operators and ISPs contend that, let alone isolated 
cases of application-blocking, for which remedies are already available in the 
regulatory framework in place, some degree of traffic shaping is needed and 
desirable in order to secure that high-speed broadband networks perform their 
functions properly. In an era of convergence, applications of different sorts are 
all converging over the same backbone, and their co-existence without any form 
of discrimination hardly serves the needs of end users. In particular, an 
increasing number of Internet applications – including VoIP, but also video 
conferencing (including telemedicine) and online gaming, etc. – are time-
sensitive, i.e., the packets sent have to get to destination in a timely manner to 
allow end users to enjoy a sufficiently attractive experience; some applications 
also require high bandwidth (e.g. IPTV)8. If sufficient QoS is not guaranteed to 
these packets on the Internet, the user experience would be disappointing and 
the growing demand for these applications would remain unsatisfied. So to say, 
allowing for reasonable discrimination (rather than mandating neutrality) 
would mean giving “power to the people”.  
The debate has unfolded in at least four different dimensions:  
(i) A technical dimension, related to the features and needs of traffic shaping, 
which stems mostly from the problem of network congestion9; 
(ii) A competitive dimension, which links neutrality to competition at the 
various layers of broadband platforms, and examines the incentives of 
different players as dependant on the degree of competitive pressure they 
face10; 
(iii) A consumerist dimension, focused on the impact of net neutrality on 
consumer access to content on the Internet11; and 
(iv) A dynamic efficiency dimension, which links net neutrality to incentives to 
invest in Next Generation Networks (NGNs)12. 
                                                   
6  This latter contention opened up an additional front of the debate, involving wireless 
operators. See, e.g., Wu (2007). 
7  E.g. Laurence Lessig (2006), Timothy Wu (2006), Robert Frieden (2006), Susan Crawford 
(2007), and Tim Berners-Lee (2007). 
8  IPTV also requires very low delay, since it cannot use buffering as users must be allowed to 
flip channels instantly.  
9  See, e.g., Yoo (2006). 
10  See Van Schewick (2007) and Wu (2003, 2004). 
11  Marsden (2007), Frieden (2007), Marsden and Cave (2007).  
12  See, e.g. Ofcom (2006). 
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It is from this latter perspective that, after years of silence, the debate finally 
arrived to the EU. This is not surprising: operators in the EU are now facing the 
challenge of upgrading their networks to NGNs – an investment that was 
estimated at €300 billion by the European Commission for the years to come. 
Given the delay in broadband penetration in many EU member states, the 
ambitious plans formulated at EU level to realise the “information society for 
all” by 2010 crucially depend on this investment13. A number of industry players 
and at least one national regulator (Ofcom) have argued that, if net neutrality is 
made mandatory, and ISPs have no possibility of charging for different levels of 
QoS, incentives to invest in NGN would be inevitably jeopardised14. Others have 
observed that European competition policy is sufficient to tackle instances of 
anticompetitive behaviour by ISPs, and that accordingly mandatory net 
neutrality would represent, at best, a “cure worse than the disease”.  
Against this background, while the European Commission has taken a rather 
“light-touch” approach to the issue in the recently proposed review of the 2002 
regulatory framework, the European Parliament is reportedly discussing a 
number of pro-neutrality amendments, some of which already surfaced in the 
“Trautmann Report” approved in July 2008.  
Commissioner Reding has recently added pathos to the debate when she 
declared, at the 2008 OECD meeting in Seoul, that  
“[t]he discussion on network neutrality is not a technical question to 
be answered by regulatory authorities but firstly a political question 
to be answered by the people: the internet is theirs!”15  
Although this seems a rather meaningful way of approaching the problem, the 
question remains unanswered: what is the best way to give “power to the 
people”? 
This paper addresses this question by describing net neutrality not only as a 
standalone debate, but also as a piece of a larger puzzle of regulatory provisions, 
whose aim is to enhance social welfare from a dynamic viewpoint. Section 1 
illustrates the economics of broadband platforms, the emerging business 
models and the growing user demand for new services and applications, and 
also describes the incentives of ISPs to engage in certain conducts that net 
neutrality advocates consider as detrimental for the future of the Internet. 
Section 2 explains whether and how the existing European regulatory 
framework and antitrust rules could tackle these behaviours when appropriate 
and needed. Section 4 concludes, by illustrating a “holistic” approach to net 
neutrality, which takes due account of market conditions and regulatory 
solutions adopted at all levels of the complex value chain of all-IP networks.  
                                                   
13  See the i2010 strategy documents on the Commission’s DG INFSO website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm.  
14  Ofcom (2006). 
15  See Viviane Reding’s speech in Seoul, SPEECH/08/336, available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/336&format=DOC
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
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1 Net neutrality: fiction v. facts 
The main players in net neutrality are almost invariably the same: on the one 
hand, a network operator or an ISP relying on a third-party network; on the 
other hand, providers of applications (IAPs) or content (ICPs) that need to pass 
through the ISP to convey their products/services to end users. One of the key 
variants in this story is whether the ISP is vertically integrated into the 
provision of a downstream service, such as VoIP or IPTV. Finally, a sometimes 
ignored player in the game is the end user, who chooses whether to purchase 
broadband connection, and also which broadband connection to purchase.  
As shown in figure 1 below for an NGN environment, IAPs and ICPs have no 
choice but to pass through an ISP to supply their products to end users. This 
apparently puts ISPs in a privileged position – that of a “toll gate” on the way to 
end users16. As is straightforward, the better the infrastructure provided by ISPs 
to IAPs and ICPs, the more attractive will the application/content be for an end 
user. This is in the interest of all players in this game: as users value more the 
applications and content they can access on the Internet, the ISP will see the 
value of its platform grow, and IAPs and ICPs will face greater demand and user 
satisfaction. 
 
Figure 1 – Layered architecture of an all-IP network 
Physical (transport) layer
(e.g. coaxial cable, backbones, routers, servers) ( . . i l l , , r t r , r r ) 
fixedi mobileil other
Logical layer
(e.g. TCP/IP, domain names, telephone numbering systems, etc.) ( . . /I , i  , t l  ri  t , t .) 
Application layer
(e.g. web browsing, streaming media, email, VoIP, database services)( . .  r i , tr i  i , il, I , t  r i )
Content layer
(e.g. web pages, audiovisual content, Voice calls)( . .  , i i l t t, i  ll )
 
 
In a nutshell, the net neutrality debate is about the means ISPs should be 
allowed to employ to reach this win-win situation: according to openists, ISPs 
should only provide the best possible service (“best-effort”) to all IAPs and ICPs 
that want to convey services to end users; according to deregulationists, ISPs 
                                                   
16  Users can/will access the NGN through many different channels, be that fixed networks 
(GPON, VDSL, etc.), wireless (HSDPA, LTE, WiMAX) or any other available means (power 
lines, satellite, etc.). But once on the network, users will find themselves on a common, high-
speed “information superhighway”: the ISP, as provider of access to the superhighway, sets 
the toll for end users (subscription fee), and delivers them on a best-effort basis (through the 
TCP/IP protocol) all available applications, services and content. 
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should be allowed to use an array of tactics, such as traffic shaping and network 
management, to efficiently organise traffic in a way that maximises satisfaction 
for subscribers.  
Looks at figure 1, the main concern expressed by net neutrality advocates is that 
players operating at the physical layer (ISPs), using the logical layer (e.g. by 
altering the TCP/IP protocol), could discriminate between players operating at 
the application and content layers (IAPs, ICPs)17. This is more likely: (i) if ISPs 
are vertically integrated into the application and/or content layers; and (ii) if 
ISPs face limited competition at the infrastructure layer, so that they can act as 
monopolists by shaping traffic in a way that departs from users’ interest18.  
The types of behaviour that are most often evoked by net neutrality advocates 
are the following: 
• Blocking Applications: an ISP may decide to block some applications or 
content, as happened in Madison River for VoIP and as reportedly happens 
in cable networks for P2P traffic19. In the former case, the ISP had blocked a 
competing service; in the latter, port blocking is meant to avoid bandwidth 
intensive and often illegal usage of the Internet.  
• Access-tiering. This occurs when an ISP reserves specific bandwidth (at a 
price independent from internet access fees) to IAPs/ICPs that are willing to 
pay for enhanced or guaranteed QoS. In doing this, ISPs have to engage 
either in packet inspection (with technologies such as protocol-header 
inspection or DPI) or at least in some identification of volumes of usage. In 
both cases, they have to deviate from the “dumb” version of the TCP/IP 
protocol and treat packets differently according to their type, nature of 
volume of bandwidth occupied20.  
• Intentional quality degradation. ISPs may intentionally degrade the quality 
of non-prioritised traffic, so that downgraded IAPs/ICPs have a stronger 
incentive to pay for higher QoS.  This is a “softer” way of foreclosing some 
applications or providers, compared to port-blocking; such conduct is more 
likely to create concerns if the downgraded IAPs/ICPs are competitors to the 
ISP.  
• Preferential arrangements with content providers. Net neutrality advocates 
are concerned that ISPs could conclude preferential agreements with specific 
ICPs to prioritise their traffic; this would allegedly thwart competition 
between content providers, as some content would enjoy superior QoS than 
others. Of course, ISPs may even decide to favour their own content, if they 
are vertically integrated into content provision.  
                                                   
17  See, i.a., Jordan (2007). 
18  In addition, advocates of net neutrality also claim that the ISP would have an incentive to 
engage in anticompetitive behaviour even if it has no market power at the infrastructure 
layer, and even if it is not vertically integrated. See Van Schewick (2007). 
19  See, i.a. Hass (2007) and infra, Section 1.1. 
20  Many useful applications of DPI exist, including the inspection of email content by spam 
filters. All email providers use DPI to achieve this result. 
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• Consumer-tiering. ISPs may have an incentive to capture their end users’ 
willingness to pay for internet access by differentiating their offer according 
to access speed offered. This is a typical case of price discrimination 
according to quality of service, as the one between economy class and 
business class on airplanes; as such, it is very mildly contested by net 
neutrality advocates.  
Section 1.1 below illustrates whether these conducts are already adopted by ISPs 
– in a word, whether and to what extent the net is “neutral” today. Section 1.2 
assesses the role and incentives of ISPs as platform operators in a multi-sided 
market context. Section 1.3 highlights the emerging demand for enhanced-QoS 
services, and the potential to reach higher social welfare by striking efficient 
transactions between IAPs/ICPs wishing to pay for higher QoS, and end users 
wishing to pay to receive higher QoS. Section 1.4 concludes.  
1.1 The net is not neutral! 
One of the often neglected aspects of the current debate on net neutrality is that, 
although the Internet was initially conceived mostly as relying on “dumb pipes” 
and placing intelligence at the edges, a lot of intelligence has been built and is 
operated also at the core of the network, and is used to shape traffic more 
efficiently. In a nutshell, the Internet, as it currently stands, is very far from 
being neutral, as traffic shaping and also application blocking already occur in 
many areas and layers of the network, mostly due to packet-sniffing 
technologies such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) at the logical layer, and 
traffic acceleration (e.g. caching services) at the application layer21. Many fixed-
line (both cable and Fibre/DSL) operators ban some forms of traffic – mostly 
BitTorrent and other P2P traffic; and wireless operators in Europe reportedly 
ban nomadic VoIP providers such as Skype, or VoIP functionality altogether22.  
Even more interestingly, many champions of net neutrality are not behaving 
themselves “neutrally”: for example, the most quoted victim of net diversity, 
Vonage, uses equipment that is able to prioritize its voice traffic over other data 
traffic, including data from competing VoIP providers23; Google has paid a 
fortune to become YouTube’s and Firefox’s preferential search engine, and 
currently contributes, together with Comcast and other players, to the Clearwire 
4G project, where all searches will be filtered primarily by Google itself as 
preferential search partner24.  
                                                   
21  A packet sniffer (also known as “network analyzer” or “protocol analyzer”) is software or 
hardware that can “intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or part of a 
network”. The sniffer can capture each packet and eventually decode and analyze its content. 
See, i.a., Frieden (2007). 
22  This occurred, or example, in the UK with the removal of VoIP functionality from Nokia N95. 
See Mobile operators lock VoIP features, by David Meyer, 20 April 2007, at 
http://news.cnet.co.uk/mobiles/0,39029678,49289855,00.htm. 
23  Hass (2008). 
24  See, i.a., Hazlett, T., On a Clearwire, you can see everything, Financial Times, 23 July 2008, 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dac15122-58cc-11dd-a093-000077b07658,s01=1.html.  
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The non-neutrality of the Internet is confirmed and, to some extent, praised also 
by authoritative spokesmen of the IT world. For example, David Clark (2008), 
one of the authors of the end-to-end principle (often misunderstood as the 
“dumb Internet” principle), recently acknowledged that “[t]he internet is not 
neutral and has not been for a long time”: access-tiering and smart traffic 
prioritization have always been features of the TCP/IP protocol25. Accordingly, 
“[t]here is not a state of grace to get back to” in the net neutrality debate26. On 
the other hand, Tim Berners-Lee recently clarified that net neutrality is far from 
revolving around non-discrimination and prohibition of tiering (at least, of 
user-tiering). As he observed, “Net Neutrality is NOT saying that one shouldn’t 
pay more money for high quality of service. We always have, and we always 
will.”27  
The fact that the Internet is not neutral entails that there is no status quo 
currently under attack by greedy ISPs wishing to shape the world according to 
their (by the way, legitimate) business interest28. To the contrary, net neutrality 
advocates look for entirely new regulation mandating a wholly new set of rules, 
realizing a wholly new equilibrium between the different layers of the Internet. 
Regulators are increasingly aware of this problem: for example, Peter Ingram 
(2007) from UK regulator Ofcom recently observed that traffic shaping already 
exists at the core of the network, and that the majority would suffer if shaping 
were prohibited29. And the European Commission has recently stated that 
product differentiation through traffic prioritisation and network management 
is, in general, desirable, as it opens up new opportunities for ICPs and increases 
consumer choice30. 
In conclusion, the net neutrality debate must be approached by having in mind 
that we live in a non-neutral world: this also means that openists are the ones 
proposing a “change” in the current Internet architecture, not the ones resisting 
to change proposed by others; and that such change must be appraised just like 
                                                   
25  Haas (2008) observes that “a free, deregulated internet and a dumb internet backbone 
network did not exist even in 1984 when Saltzer, Reed, and Clark weighed the concepts”. 
26  See http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/net-neutrality.html 
27  See the blog post by Tim Berners Lee, available at 
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/144. See also George Ou’s blog post, A rational 
debate on Net neutrality, explaining the existing agreements aimed at reserving band 
portions to business customers.  
28  See also Faulhaber (2007), rejecting the “a bit is a bit is a bit” idea and, quoting Blumenthal 
and Clark (2003), observing that “this particular vision of the Internet as pure end-to-end 
was probably never true in practice and if it were it would certainly be a bad idea”. 
29  See presentation by Peter Ingram, Ofcom’s Chief Technology Officer, Should Regulators be 
Concerned about Net Neutrality?, available online at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/speeches/2006/12/net_neutrality_111206.pdf  
30  See the Commission’s Impact Assessment on the proposed review of the e-communications 
framework, stating that “product differentiation is generally considered to be beneficial for 
the market (particularly in industries with large fixed and sunk costs) so long as users have 
choice to access the transmission capabilities and the services they want. Allowing broadband 
operators to differentiate their products may make market entry of content providers more 
likely, thereby leading to a less concentrated industry structure and more consumer choice”. 
SEC(2007)1472, at 91, note 208 and accompanying text.  
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any other policy – i.e. comparing its costs and benefits with the costs and 
benefits of alternative policy options, including the “zero” or “do nothing” 
option. Perhaps the most balanced way of approaching the issue is the 
following: with the migration to NGNs, some authors and industry players 
express concern that already existing practices such as traffic shaping may be 
more intensively used by ISPs, negatively affecting the openness and pluralism 
normally attached to the “network of networks”. Where does the line fall 
between “good” and “bad” network management, is the real unresolved issue.  
1.2 The supply side: ISPs as platform operators in multi-sided 
markets 
The role of ISPs is a layered NGN architecture is of course essential, but also 
tricky. Understanding the incentives and choices ISPs face when deciding 
whether to set up a broadband platform is essential for a thorough 
understanding of the muddy economics of net neutrality.  
In all-IP networks, ISPs act as intermediaries between end users and IAPs/ICPs, 
just as yellow pages match consumers and advertisers, broadcasters allow 
content distributors and advertisers to reach the eyes of consumers; and 
developers of computer operating systems allow end user access to middleware 
and applications. In a word, NGNs are multi-sided markets, where supply (IAPs, 
ICPs) and demand (end users) meet on a platform provided by the ISP31.  
The multi-sided nature of NGNs entails that ISPs will be able to build a 
successful platform only if they manage to strike the right balance between the 
interests and preferences of end users and those of IAPs/ICPs, plus all the 
interests of other platform users such as device producers, DRM developers and 
advertisers. The take-up of a given platform, moreover, crucially depends on the 
platform operator’s ability to attract complementary products and services from 
all layers of the NGN architecture – including access to a broadband network, 
access to premium content and key applications, connectivity with supporting 
hardware devices, and a sufficiently large customer installed base to attract 
advertising investment. Figure 2 shows the interdependency between all players 
on the value chain and the central role of platform operators. The typical setting 
in the net neutrality debate is one where the platform operator is also a network 
operator and is vertically integrated as an IAP and/or ICP. 
                                                   
31 See Evans (2003), Rochet-Tirole (2004), etc.  
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Figure 2 - Multi-sided digital platform 
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Source: Elaboration on Poel, Renda and Ballon (2007).  
 
From the viewpoint of ISPs, creating a successful platform means thus “getting 
all sides on board”, and securing that the platform can offer high-quality 
content, killer applications, attractive services and appealing devices before the 
platform operator can successfully plan to attract consumer demand and 
consequently revenues from consumer, advertisers, or both.32 This strategy 
requires a careful exploitation of indirect and direct network effects, but can 
prove extremely complex, as players face a “chicken or egg” problem33. Such a 
dilemma can be solved only by carefully using two strategic variables, pricing 
and quality of service. 
The economic literature on multi-sided markets explains that ISPs should price 
higher on those categories of users that have a stronger willingness to pay, as 
they attach a high value to the platform. A peculiarity of multi-sided platforms is 
that the optimal price structure is completely unrelated to the underlying cost of 
the service provided to each side – to the contrary, it is a function of indirect 
network effects. 
In broadband platforms, indirect network externalities will materialise on the 
two sides of the platform: (i) the platform is more valuable to end users, the 
higher the number of applications and the wider the choice of content that can 
be reached through the ISP’s network; (ii) at the same time, the platform is 
                                                   
32  Platforms, in this respect, share the same features as system goods, and all players on the 
value chain can be defined as complementors of the same complex product. See, for an early 
contribution, Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, 1998, Harvard BS Press.  
33  Evans (2003), Rochet-Tirole (2004). A similar statement is found in the policy conclusions of 
Marsden and Cave (2007). 
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more attractive for an IAP/ICP, the greater the number of its subscribers, as 
applications and contents can reach more users and “eyeballs”. In more 
qualitative terms, (iii) the platform is more attractive for end users, the higher 
the quality of the services and applications they have access to, especially for 
QoS-sensitive applications34; and (iv) given that the end users are more willing 
to pay for high-QoS services, especially in QoS-sensitive applications (VoIP, 
IPTV, online gaming, etc.), also IAPs will be more willing to pay the ISP to 
secure a high QoS on the ISP network. 
The optimal pricing structure for an ISP wishing to develop a broadband 
platform is hard to predict, as economists agree that the right balance between 
all parties would have to be seen on a case-by-case basis, and often requires trial 
and error35. However, the peculiar features of all sides of the market suggest 
that charging only end users for access would hardly be an optimal strategy. To 
the contrary, many similar multi-sided platforms decide to charge a very low 
price to end users, in order to build a sufficient customer installed base, and 
then ask application and content providers to pay for reaching these users with 
sufficient QoS. However, under mandatory net neutrality an ISP would be 
forced to charge only consumers, at most versioning offers in terms of access 
speed (consumer-tiering). This, in turn, means that the price of Internet access 
to end users will be very high, as subscribers will bear the full cost faced by the 
ISP in setting up and running the platform36.  
On the contrary, allowing ISPs to subsidise access through QoS fees and a 
certain degree of application-tiering would rebalance the pricing structure of the 
platform, allowing for greater demand and participation of all users to the 
platform. Along a similar line of argument, Darby (2007) calculated that if 
carriers could recover as low as 10% of the common costs of building an NGN 
from content providers, the consumer welfare gains over a 10-year period would 
reach $8 billion. Likewise, Sidak (2008) extends this rationale to all broadband 
users, not just to NGNs, and estimates that such a subsidy would allow 
broadband access providers to reduce their access prices to end-users by $5 to 
$10 per month, with savings ranging from $3 billion to $6 billion per year. This 
reduction in cost would also have very desirable consequences in terms of 
number of subscriptions to broadband networks. Sidak (2007) finds that as a 
consequence to a $5 price reduction in the monthly access price, an additional 
14.3 million homes would subscribe to broadband access, given current 
estimates on elasticity of demand for broadband. 
                                                   
34  For example, the availability of VoIP does not in and of itself add much value to the platform, 
if the VoIP service exhibits very bad quality, delays and feedback, so that it will never be 
considered as a reliable substitute to PSTN telephony. 
35  See, i.a., Faulhaber (2007). 
36  For example, an end user values the platform more if the number of applications available on 
that platform, or also the quantity and quality of content, increases. Likewise, a platform x 
has a greater value to an IAP the greater the number of subscribers to x. ICPs would be more 
willing to pay for posting their content on x if x has a large user installed base. See, i.a., Evans 
(2003), Rochet and Tirole (2004). 
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Moreover, approaching net neutrality from a multi-sided market perspective is 
also useful as it implies that no real difference exists between consumer-tiering 
and application-tiering: they are both forms of user-tiering, but users belong to 
different sides. From an economic viewpoint, there is no difference between 
price discrimination applied to one side of the market (users) and 
discrimination on another side (IAP, ICP).  
Even more importantly, the economics of two-sided markets explains very 
clearly that the only player able to devise an optimal way of balancing interests 
on all sides of the platform is the ISP. Only platform operators would know 
whether pricing tools to segment the heterogeneity of demand, such as peak 
load pricing or volume pricing, are fit for their own platform and subscriber 
base. A rigid regulatory environment hampering any mixed pricing structure 
and quality management would simply kill any attempt to set up successful 
platforms, and consequently also service innovation, infrastructure deployment, 
broadband uptake, and ultimately consumer welfare.  
1.3 The demand side: enhanced-QoS applications 
The problem raised by net neutrality advocates is, at first blush, easy to solve. In 
virtually all markets, demand for higher quality is normally matched by 
suppliers through the supply of higher quality. Examples are virtually endless. 
Users wishing to ship envelopes with guarantee of delivery within a given time-
span pay a higher price to express couriers (e.g. DHL, UPS, FedEx, etc.). 
Travellers wishing more comfort and more flexible travel conditions pay higher 
prices for enhance QoS on airplanes by purchasing business class tickets or 
more flexible fares37. Producers of food and beverages wishing to attract 
consumers to their products in supermarkets pay for display space and best 
shelves. Advertisers wishing to appear on the top right area of Google’s search 
engine – the best area on the desktop devoted to commercial ads – place their 
bids in Google’s auctions and eventually pay more money to secure this 
privileged position and a better “click-thru” rate38. Spectators wishing to enjoy a 
privileged view of the scene and an enhanced experience in theatres pay front 
row tickets at a higher price.  
Broadband platforms make no difference. ISPs, in trying to get all sides on 
board, have the possibility of reserving bandwidth for some specific uses that 
require a minimum or guaranteed QoS. If they are unable to provide such 
services to end users, the value of their platform to them would be significantly 
reduced. More in detail, ISPs know that, if a sufficient portion of end users 
demand applications that require a high QoS, inability to match this demand 
would mean losing profits twice: first, because customers would attach a lower 
value to the platform (reduced demand from the side of end users); secondly, 
                                                   
37  For a similar example, see Marcus (2007). 
38  See Varian (2007), Position Auctions, International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 
1163–1178. 
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because customers would be less attractive for IAPs wishing to serve them 
(weaker indirect network effects)39. 
To the contrary, if the ISP can manage to extract more value by matching the 
demand and supply for QoS-sensitive applications, overall welfare would 
certainly increase. This, however, requires that ISPs are able to efficiently 
discriminate between applications by prioritising some forms of traffic over 
others – something net neutrality advocates would not welcome.  
But how can ISPs achieve this efficient discrimination? Overall, they should 
locate the existing demand for higher-than-average quality services and the 
corresponding supply. Secondly, they should anticipate the emerging new 
sources of demand for these services, and conceive an efficient response to this 
trend. 
• As regards the existing demand from the end user side, caching services such 
as those provided by Akamai or prioritisation services offered by PlusNet 
confirm the growing need for “better than best-effort” services40. Business 
users wishing to enjoy higher QoS – including reliability, security of data 
transfer, timeliness of voice signals in conference calls, etc. – need sufficient 
speed and security to efficiently migrate to new services: are we sure that 
denying the possibility of a business class ticket on the Internet is welfare-
enhancing? The same can be said for residential users having to decide 
whether to abandon traditional voice telephony for VoIP, or analogue TV for 
IPTV: only a high QoS can lead them to the water.  
• Alongside with this increased demand, the heterogeneity of end users has 
also remarkably increased: some users require only modest bandwidth (e.g. 
for checking their email and reading online news); whereas so-called 
“bandwidth hogs” consume much more (e.g. for movie downloads, p2p 
exchange, etc.). Figure 3 below shows an elaboration by George Ou (2007) of 
ZDNet, completed in occasion of the FCC hearings on Comcast’s network 
management practices at Harvard University in February 2008. As shown in 
the picture, some applications such as BitTorrent are way more bandwidth-
intensive than others41. 
                                                   
39  See Faulhaber (2007), stating that “Actions which make their offering less attractive to 
customers hurts the profitability of the firm both directly (lost customer revenues) and 
indirectly (reduction in their attractiveness to application providers).” 
40  See Haas (2008). Akamai Technologies delivers content on behalf of its customers using a 
widely dispersed network of servers. Akamai’s acceleration services improve both 
performance and reliability for content providers by delivering content to end users with 
enforced QoS and distributed delivery. Akamai’s site accelerator service can cache a content 
provider’s data on Akamai’s worldwide network of servers. Its enhanced QoS service provides 
customers with “high performance and reliability” that it has described as critical to user 
experiences.  
41  For Wideband VoIP over VPN, Ou (2008) used Corporate VPN telecommuter worker using 
G.722 codec at 64 Kbps payload and 33.8 Kbps packetization overhead; VoIP is obtained with 
reference to Vonage or Lingo SIP-based VoIP service with G.726 codec at 32 Kbps payload 
and 18.8 Kbps packetization overhead. In addition, email sending considers 29,976 kilobytes 
of mail over a 56-days timeframe, averaging 0.04956 Kbps. 
THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ITS (IR)RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE 
13 
Figure 3 – average upstream Kbps 
 
Source: Ou (2008) 
 
Table 3 below, also developed by Ou, illustrates the different usage patterns 
associated with different applications, including downloads. As shown in the 
table, applications like Netflix Video on Demand or P2P downloading 
currently consume a lot of bandwidth. Compared with monthly caps such as 
those applied by cable operators Comcast and Time Warner in the US, this 
yields a daily “budget” of less than 5 hours. This suggests that also in Europe, 
as flat-price streaming services become more widespread – as is likely to 
occur for video streaming in an NGN environment – users will become more 
like the current P2P “bandwidth hogs”. 
Table 1 – bandwidth and usage intensity for some applications 
 
Absent any traffic shaping by ISPs, problems would skyrocket: in particular, 
as already occurs (especially in European countries), very intensive users may 
eat up most of the bandwidth and negatively affect the user experience of 
other, less demanding users – have you ever experienced a slowdown in your 
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service because someone else in house was downloading a movie from 
BitTorrent? Traffic shaping may take different forms in this case, all of which 
are potentially desirable: (i) on the one hand, peak load pricing can prove 
useful in times of congestion, as occurs, for example, in electricity markets; 
(ii) volume-based pricing is already being used by US carriers in order to 
more effectively segment the demand and avoid both congestion and cross-
subsidisation between heavy users and lighter ones42, though this option is 
unlikely to tackle all problems of congestion, and especially “jitter”43; and (iii) 
bandwidth caps for p2p traffic are also being experimented to avoid 
degrading the quality of user experience for all users wishing to use other, 
less bandwidth-intensive services. 
• Concerning other sides of all-IP platforms, ISPs also face strong demand for 
high-QoS services from IAPs and ICPs. Assuming competition between ISPs, 
content and application producers will pretend, when negotiating 
distribution through the ISP, a sufficient QoS – and this is what they actually 
do. If ISP are not able to reserve part of the bandwidth to ensure that these 
services are supplied efficiently, economically efficient transactions would 
not be possible, to the detriment of consumer and social welfare.  
In conclusion, ISPs face a very differentiated demand from platform users, 
encompassing end users, on one side, and IAPs/ICPs on the other. In addition, 
with the advent of new services such as IPTV, this demand is likely to become 
stronger in the future. And especially for IPTV, the impossibility to prioritise 
packets may determine the impossibility of providing a satisfactory experience 
to end users, due to the high bandwidth and very low delay requirements44.  
All these developments lead to a torturing dilemma: on the one hand, 
everything seems to suggest that traffic management and prioritisation of 
certain bits over others is the only possible way to ensure that the emerging 
demand for new services is satisfied, and consumer welfare thus served. On the 
other hand, this also means that the Internet may become a “two-speed” 
network, where some services enjoy priority over others. This, according to 
some commentators, may deprive the Internet of its stunning revolutionary 
potential to enable the bottom-up emergence of new services such as the “next” 
Napster, YouTube and MySpace, which would inevitably be left in the “dirt 
track” of the Internet. 
                                                   
42  Recently, Comcast announced it has begun a test to slow the transfer of files to individual 
subscribers who are its heaviest users during congested periods. Also Time Warner Cable 
announced that it plans to start testing metered Internet access, charging consumers $1 for 
each gigabyte of content over their allotment. However, it must be recalled that volume caps 
or metered pricing only deal with average consumption over the course of an hour or a day, 
not peak consumption on the network, which causes problematic congestion.  
43  Metered pricing cannot deal with microscopic congestion storms called “jitter” that last from 
0.1 seconds to 2 seconds.  During these sub-second congestion storms, delay-sensitive 
applications such as online gaming or VoIP will break. See, i.a., Felten (2006), at 4. 
44  See, e.g. George Ou, Why HD Movie Downloads are a Big Lie, ZDNet Blog Post, March 31st, 
2007.  
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The latter argument is however misleading both in the premises and in the 
conclusions. Since the net is not neutral today, why hasn’t the Internet become a 
two-speed machine with a dirt track and a fast lane? If net diversity is not a 
(bad) future prospect, but is the continuation of what already occurs today, why 
should we change it? In short, why fix what ain’t broke? 
Some explanations for the persistence of a reasonably “open” Internet have 
already been given – the most acrobatic being that ISPs are trying to behave 
properly since they are under the spotlight, but will soon change their behaviour 
in the future45. But once the peculiar economics of broadband platforms are 
duly taken into account, it becomes clear that end users play a very important 
role in dictating the features and average quality of their Internet experience. In 
doing this, they exercise a true disciplining effect on market conduct by platform 
operators: in a nutshell, as recalled by Viviane Reding, end users choose every 
day what they want to have and see on the Internet: the real challenge for ISPs, 
IAPs, ICPs and all other players in the value chain is to follow suit with the most 
effective set of applications and services.  
2 Net neutrality and competition 
The previous section turned down most of the key concerns expressed by net 
neutrality proponents, and in particular those related to the end-to-end 
principle and the dangers of network management. Being platform operators in 
two-sided markets, ISPs can increase social welfare by engaging in network 
management and more effectively matching the demand of end users with the 
demand by IAPs and ICPs. Even without specific regulation, ISPs would be 
unlikely to block applications or virtually foreclose content from their platforms: 
to some extent, what is bad for IAPs and ICPs is also bad for the ISP, as indirect 
network effects ensure that the platform’s value to end users increases along 
with the applications and content available on it. This, alone, suggests that 
mandating net neutrality through rigid ex ante regulation would make little 
sense from an economic viewpoint.  
There is, however, a different side of the story, which can be seen as the 
pathological degeneration of a physiologically desirable situation. This occurs: 
(1) whenever the ISP is vertically integrated into the higher layers, and has an 
interest in foreclosing competing IAPs or ICPs to secure that its subscribers 
use its own services and applications; and  
(2) whenever an IAP or ICP has an interest in “closing” the architecture by 
paying the ISP to obtain exclusive QoS, which is not available to competitors 
on the ISP’s platform46.  
Of the two cases, the former is the most commonly cited by net neutrality 
proponents. Below, I briefly analyse both settings. 
                                                   
45  Faulhaber (2007), at 697.  
46  See Faulhaber (2007) for this case.  
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2.1 Foreclosure by a vertically integrated ISP 
Assume an ISP x is vertically integrated as VoIP provider. This being the case, 
the ISP could decide to:  
(i) Block competing VoIP providers (as in Madison River: x is the only VoIP 
service available to subscribers of x); 
(ii) Reserve part of the bandwidth only for its VoIP service, thus securing a 
competitive advantage over rivals (x’s service has guaranteed QoS, the 
others are provided under “best-effort”: all these services are available on x’s 
platform)47; 
(iii) Ask competing VoIP services to pay for QoS, if they wish to compete with x’s 
VoIP with the same QoS level (x’s service and also competing services have 
guaranteed QoS, and all are available on x’s platform). 
Of the three conducts mentioned above, the first is the least likely to occur. This 
is confirmed both by theory and evidence. By theory, since reducing the number 
of applications available on an ISP’s network also means reducing the value of 
the platform to end users. By evidence, since the Madison River case has 
remained an isolated case – and only wireless operators have decided to block 
Skype in some cases, due to its “supernode” features, problems of bandwidth 
and business model48. 
The second case are indeed likely to occur – and actually do occur in practice. 
For example, cable operators in the US create a different circuit-switched 
network for their own phone and TV service, reserving often more than 90% of 
their frequency spectrum over their cable infrastructure, and leaving only a few 
channels to their Internet service, where other players can rely on best-effort 
service49.  
The latter case may occur in a future NGN environment, especially if net 
neutrality is not mandated by legislation. This scenario would possess the rare 
virtue of allowing for sustainable competition between infrastructure-based 
providers (the ISP) and nomadic players (the “Googles” and “Yahoos”) in the 
provision of competing services. One of the consequences of this scenario would 
be that the price applied by ISPs to competing VoIP providers would have to be 
such as to create a “level-playing-field” between players facing completely 
                                                   
47  A similar case occurs when the ISP intentionally degrades the quality of competing VoIP 
services, by denying priority to their services. This may occur also if an ISP does not offer 
jitter-correction services to VoIP providers for their applications. 
48  For wireless operators, the “walled garden” model is often a forced choice, due to bandwidth 
limitations. As stated by the OECD, “[t]here is a difference between fixed and mobile 
networks in that mobile operators must rely on scarce spectrum resources through licensing 
requirements and may find it more difficult to expand capacity to meet demand growth”.  See 
OECD, Mobile multiple Play: new service pricing and policy implications, 
DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2006)1/FINAL, at 40. Skype or other applications have been blocked also 
due to problems with the phone vendor: this was the case of Apple, as long as the iPhone 
store was not entirely set up. 
49  Also telecom operators may do this by using a different and dedicated frequency for analog 
phone. 
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different cost structures. Another consequence is that the free-rider problem 
often denounced by ISPs would be solved, at least as regards services for which 
the ISP competes with nomadic players. 
In all scenarios, the solutions devised by the ISP will be dictated by its own 
profit-maximising incentives, given market conditions. For example, if there are 
many competing ISPs, and some of them allow a number of VoIP providers to 
compete with high QoS, also x may decide to follow a similar strategy, and the 
negotiated price for QoS will be likely to approximate the competitive level, thus 
creating a true level-playing field for VoIP providers on x’s platform.  
However, if the ISP has market power, it may use such power vis à vis nomadic 
providers, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage. If VoIP providers 
have no countervailing buyer power, this may result in undesirable outcomes 
such as margin squeeze – i.e., the “wholesale” price paid by nomadic VoIP 
providers to x is too high to allow them to price competitively at retail level; or 
non-price discrimination – i.e. intentional degradation of the QoS granted to 
competing VoIP providers to encourage end users to switch to x’s service.  
All in all, this appears to me as a textbook case for antitrust enforcement against 
vertical integration by a firm enjoying market power in a primary market – in 
our case, access to broadband. As a result, far from calling for new legislation, 
this problem can be solved either by applying competition policy or, if any 
condition is found to warrant a more structural and systematic intervention, 
through ex ante price regulation – the latter case being made even more 
complicated by the multi-sided nature of the market at hand50.  
2.2 IAPs/ICPs looking for exclusivity or preferential treatment 
Most of the net neutrality debate focuses on cases in which ISPs can allegedly 
stifle competition by discriminating against weaker IAPs or ICPs. However, as 
widely acknowledged, the Web is populated by very powerful champions of the 
application and content layer, which may enjoy rather strong bargaining power 
vis-à-vis ISPs, especially if the latter compete with other providers in the 
primary market for Internet access. In layered architectures, market power can 
come from any of the layers, and conditions for service provisions may be 
dictated by players other than the ISP51.  
In particular, in order to set up a successful broadband platform, an ISP needs 
to secure that key applications and premium content are made available on that 
platform: as a matter of fact, user demand is driven much more by the 
applications and content available on a platform than by the ISP itself. 
Against this background, one of the potential consequences of a non-neutral 
Internet is that one IAP or ICP could try to achieve or preserve a paramount 
position in its own relevant market by securing a privileged treatment by the 
                                                   
50  In particular, the literature on multi-sided platforms suggests that for these markets, 
common cost allocation, cost-based pricing and many other traditional regulatory methods 
are not indicated. See infra, section 3. 
51  Renda (2006). 
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ISP. This can lead to the following outcomes, very well known to scholars in the 
IT field: 
• A very powerful IAP/ICP threatens to leave a platform is the ISP awards 
similar treatment to its competitors; 
• A IAP/ICP pays a fee to the ISP to become its preferential provider in its own 
relevant market; or 
• An IAP/ICP pays a fee to the ISP to obtain exclusivity. 
The first case is very similar to what occurred in the US Microsoft case, where 
one of the alleged conducts was that Microsoft threatened OEMs to withdraw or 
modify the license for Windows, if they preinstalled Netscape Navigator in their 
browsers52. I thus assume this would become a matter for antitrust, not 
regulation, should such a behaviour occur in the broadband market. Such a 
conduct would be likely to create antitrust concerns whenever it risks 
foreclosing competitors from the relevant market, and thus also whenever the 
conduct is aimed at most or all ISPs active in the broadband market.  
The second case corresponds to a widespread practice in the IT world. For 
example, Google pays a fee to be the preferential search engine of Mozilla 
Firefox and YouTube, and could decide to do it also with ISPs. This conduct is 
unlikely to create competition concerns, to the extent that it does not lead to 
foreclosure of competitors in the relevant market. However, when the IAP/ICP 
seeks exclusivity in a highly concentrated market for broadband access, end 
users may face an unacceptable restriction of competition: for example, they 
may have only one platform of choice (the ISP is a monopolist), and one search 
engine of choice (because it has secured exclusivity). In this extreme case, if 
demand for the broadband platform is sufficiently strong and rigid, the final 
outcome would portrait a world without choice, which certainly does not serve 
the interest of consumers.  
Also this case, however, would be qualified as a case of vertical foreclosure and 
tackled by antitrust authorities as a standard textbook case. Accordingly, also in 
this case no specific regulation would be needed.  
2.3 Conclusion: a solution in search of a problem? 
Under the lens of economic theory and individual incentives, mandatory net 
neutrality does not pass muster. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine 
situations in which network operators would have an incentive to discriminate 
between applications or content, or even engage in port blocking, this does not 
seem to portrait a situation different from that occurring in many other 
markets. As a matter of fact, in all markets things can go wrong, but before 
intervening regulators normally wait for things to go wrong.  
This section suggests that mandating net neutrality would not be a desirable 
option. For the problems that may arise, indeed a much softer form of 
                                                   
52  See Renda (2004) and Pardolesi and Renda (2005).  
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regulation could be needed – e.g. ensuring that end users are effectively 
informed of usage restrictions on available broadband platforms, and can 
compare available offers in the most informed way. And in addition, antitrust 
scrutiny is there to ensure that competition is not stifled by any of the players 
active on the complex value chain of multi-sided broadband platforms.  
3 Do we need any new regulation? 
The previous section has shown that what raises concerns among net neutrality 
advocates is mostly the risk of discriminatory conduct by ISPs holding market 
power in broadband Internet access. This corresponds to conduct considered as 
anticompetitive under ordinary antitrust rules: as a matter of fact, the fact that 
the debate emerged in the US is not surprising, given that on that side of the 
Atlantic antitrust laws have not been applied very often to telecommunication 
and information services, since ad hoc regulation – in particular, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act – was in place53. In 2004, the Supreme Court decision 
in Trinko clarified the boundaries existing between the FCC competences and 
conduct falling under antitrust laws54. In addition, in the US broadband 
networks have been deregulated by the FCC since 2003, starting with FTTH and 
FTTB and lately also extended to DSL.  
These features of the US market – in particular, no overlap with antitrust laws 
and extensive deregulation of broadband networks through “regulatory 
holidays” – are very far away from the European situation. In the EU, the 2002 
regulatory framework is in place as an ex ante complement to ex post antitrust 
scrutiny, and antitrust laws have been extensively applied in the e-
communications sector in the past years. This type of scrutiny has usefully 
complemented the reach of ex ante regulation, which in turn borrows most of its 
tools from antitrust practice. 
Moreover, European antitrust laws are conceived and – most importantly – 
applied in a way that differs substantially from what occurs in the US. This is 
particularly evident when it comes to unilateral conduct (monopolization in the 
US v. abuse of dominance in the EU) and vertical agreements, i.e. the two types 
of conduct that are most closely related to the net neutrality debate55. The more 
pervasive reach of antitrust in Europe, though often criticised, provides an 
additional guarantee that neutrality concerns would have an adequate forum for 
scrutiny, where appropriate.  
Finally, also the peculiar design and scope of the EU regulatory framework for e-
communications, and in particular its comprehensive set of remedies for cases 
of discrimination by a firm holding significant market power (SMP), or even in 
cases where no firm has SMP, constitutes a more solid safety net for end users, 
should discriminatory conduct emerge.  
                                                   
53  See Renda (2006, 2007) for an overview.  
54  See Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
55  See, i.a., Fox, E. M. (2006), Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of 
Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, Utah L.R. Vol. 3, 725. 
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This section briefly considers whether existing rules – both the ex ante 
regulation and ex post antitrust scrutiny – are sufficient to tackle net neutrality 
concerns in Europe. Section 2.1 describes antitrust rules, whereas Section 2.2 
describes the existing rules contained in the 2002 regulatory framework for e-
communications, and the current proposal advanced by the European 
Commission.  
3.1 Antitrust law  
Discriminatory conducts identified as relevant for net neutrality, if adopted by a 
dominant ISP, correspond to items in the EU trustbuster’s toolkit. In particular, 
port blocking by a dominant ISP would be addressed as refusal to deal under 
Article 82; intentional quality degradation and tiering would be defined as 
discrimination, also covered by Article 82 (i.e. “applying different conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage”); exclusive agreements between a dominant ISP and 
IAPs/ICPs may fall under Article 81, and could be justified only if, as specified at 
Art. 81(3), they lead to efficiencies that are shared, to a large extent, by end 
users.  
As confirmed by developments in the case law of the European Court of Justice, 
dominant firms in the EU are considered to hold a special responsibility vis à 
vis their rivals and end users, which – however vaguely defined – should lead to 
an enhanced attention towards preserving competition in the relevant market. 
The “special responsibility” is often recalled in instances of “essential facilities”, 
where the scrutinised undertaking holds an asset that is not easy to replicate in 
a way that is both technically and economically viable. Both concepts (special 
responsibility and essential facility) are subject to debate in the EU, and have in 
practice been applied in several cases by the European Court of Justice. In 
particular, if applied to the net neutrality setting, the essential facility doctrine 
would lead – where appropriate – to mandating competitor access at FRAND 
conditions on the dominant ISP’s network, and to the impossibility of 
discriminating between IAPs and ICPs unless very specific circumstances are 
verified.  
The cases in which Article 82 can be applied to the net neutrality setting are 
briefly described below. 
3.1.1 Refusal to deal 
In order for port blocking to be considered as a refusal to deal under Article 82, 
a number of conditions have to be verified. In particular, the doctrine of refusal 
to supply has been shaped under the essential facility heading in cases such as 
Bronner, Magill, IMS Health and, lately, Microsoft. The four conditions that 
need to be observed for an antitrust authority to sanction an ISP for 
anticompetitive refusal to supply are the following: 
• The ISP refusing access must be dominant in its relevant market – this 
means, i.a. holding a significant market share, being shielded from potential 
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entry of competitors in the short to medium-term, and facing no significant 
countervailing buyer power from IAPs/ICPs that lament exclusion; 
• The refusal must have fallen on an essential element, without which the 
alleged victim cannot reasonably operate in the relevant market; 
• The effect of the refusal must be that of impeding the entry into the relevant 
market of a new product, potentially subject to significant stand-alone 
demand by end-users; and 
• The refusal must not be “objectively justified”.  
For some years, especially after the ECJ decision in Magill and IMS Health, the 
application of these criteria has been rather intuitive. In particular, the first two 
conditions would occur whenever there is virtually no alternative to reach end 
users than to rely on the refusing ISP’s network: this immediately leads to the 
foreclosure of IAPs/ICPs that have been refused access from the relevant 
market. However, based on Magill, the ISP’s refusal would have to prevent a 
new product from entering the relevant market – which could sometimes be the 
case for ICPs, but is unlikely to be often the case for IAPs, unless the application 
they wish to use on the ISP’s network is a brand new one.  
However, the recent CFI decision in Microsoft has changes significantly the 
interpretation of the “new product” screen in cases of refusal to grant 
interoperability. The CFI, in particular, affirmed that for the new product test to 
be satisfied, it suffices that the ISP’s conduct deprives competitors in a 
secondary market of the possibility to compete on an equal footing: no proof of 
a really “new” product or service is needed, if not the proof that, absent the 
refusal opposed by the dominant undertaking, competitors could reorganise 
themselves and eventually offer new products and contribute to technological 
advancements in the market at hand56. If this interpretation will be confirmed in 
future judgments, excluded IAPs/ICPs would not need to prove that the product 
being foreclosed was actually “new”.   
Finally, the “objective justification” screen has been very narrowly interpreted in 
past cases and in the literature, and is mostly confined to reasons of security and 
integrity of one’s own product. This also means that, if an ISP blocks an 
IAP/ICP because granting access would seriously threaten the security or 
integrity of its own network, then such refusal would not be considered 
unreasonable under community antitrust laws57.  
In conclusion, in principle port blocking by a dominant ISP can be effectively 
tackled by Article 82 under the “refusal to deal” heading, provided that some 
                                                   
56  See Pardolesi and Renda (2004); and more recently, C. Ahlborn and D.S. Evans, (2008), The 
Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms 
in Europe, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115867.  
57  As one of the most famous advocates of net neutrality regulation, Tim Wu, recently explained, 
exceptions could be foreseen whenever neutrality could impair network integrity and/or 
security, or when derogating from neutrality can prevent users from interfering with others 
by implementing bandwidth limits, spam, worm, and virus protection, and limits on denial of 
service attacks. Tim Wu (2004), The Broadband Debate: A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, at 95.  
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clarifications are introduced on the meaning of “new product” and “objective 
justification”. 
3.1.2 Leveraging, discrimination and quality degradation 
Article 82 also covers cases in which a dominant undertaking applies “different 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage”, as recalled by the ECJ in Tetra Pak. This, 
in turn, means that an IAP/ICP that was discriminated by a dominant ISP 
(especially if vertically integrated) through quality degradation could claim that 
it was placed at a competitive disadvantage by conduct, the purpose of which 
was to apply different conditions to transactions that – even if not identical – 
were equivalent.  
Note that this conduct would only be sanctioned in antitrust terms whenever the 
quality-degraded application is in the same relevant market of other 
applications (for example, the ISP’s own application) that are granted higher 
QoS. Antitrust only challenges these situations, not cases in which traffic is 
prioritised to award precedence to some “relevant markets” over others58.  
As a result, the statement according to which antitrust laws can tackle all 
behaviours contested by net neutrality proponents is imprecise. Application-
tiering is not covered by the scope of antitrust laws, if not in cases where the ISP 
favours its own (or its preferred) service over competing ones, which are placed 
at a competitive disadvantaged.  
This case would mostly fall under the “leveraging” heading. Article 82 has been 
often applied to conduct aimed at leveraging market power from a primary 
market into an adjacent market (or an aftermarket). As we concluded in the 
previous sections, an ISP holding market power at the physical layer may have 
an incentive to monopolize an adjacent market or, at least, to vertically integrate 
to seek more profits at the expenses of competitors59. In antitrust terms, this 
conduct is termed (offensive) leveraging of market power. The possibility of 
welfare-reducing leveraging is a recurrent argument used by post-Chicago 
economists to challenge the Chicago “single monopoly profit” theorem, 
according to which a monopolist in a primary market would have no incentive 
to attempt to monopolise an adjacent competitive market, as there is only one 
monopoly profit to be reaped60.  
Against this background, the European Commission has had the chance to 
clarify its position on leveraging during the EU Microsoft case decided in 2004 
and later by the CFI in 2007. As already clarified supra for refusal to deal, here 
the recent CFI decision seems to suggest that a more openness-oriented 
                                                   
58  The same, as observed by Huo et al. (2008), would occur for cases in which the ISP 
intentionally degrades the QoS of all non-prioritised traffic to encourage firms to buy 
prioritisation services. 
59  Van Schewick (2007).  
60  See M.D. Whinston, “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion”, American Economic Review, Vol. 
80, No. 4, 1990, pp. 837-859. 
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approach will be adopted by the Commission in leveraging cases entailing 
interoperability. Following the (rather awkward) rationale of the CFI in 
Microsoft, it appears obvious that a dominant ISP that adopts leveraging 
strategies to expand its dominion to higher layers will be sanctioned also if the 
ISP does not block any port, but uses contractual conditions and traffic 
management in order to achieve a paramount position in the target market, 
unduly discriminating against its competitors.  
3.1.3 Vertical arrangements 
Finally, net neutrality issues may arise, according to “openists”, whenever ISPs 
conclude preferential distribution agreements with IAPs or, most often, ICPs. 
This would occur, for example, if an ISP concluded a contract with a premium 
content owner to distribute some content with higher QoS than other types of 
content. Similar behaviour also occurs at higher layers – think, as one example, 
about Google’s contracts with YouTube or Mozilla Firefox to be the latter's 
preferential search engine.  
In any event, these types of agreements would be considered as vertical 
agreements under antitrust laws, and thus potentially subject to Article 81 EU 
Treaty. In particular, agreements exceeding the threshold for exemption are 
scrutinised under Article 81(1), based on their potential to foreclose rivals61. As 
stated by the ECJ in the famous Delimitis judgment, agreements that do not 
completely impede entry of new competitors (to the ICP) are very unlikely to be 
found restricting competition.  
Overall, it seems that antitrust laws would not be sufficient to tackle preferential 
agreements between ISPs and ICPs for traffic prioritisation, unless these 
agreements seriously affect competition. This is not necessarily a bad thing: 
perhaps the fact that antitrust rules would not sanction this type of conduct 
means that it should not be challenged? 
3.2 Sector-specific regulation 
In force since 2003, the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications borrows most of its tools from antitrust scrutiny, and is firmly 
based in the principle of technology neutrality and – when appropriate – 
network openness. The framework rotates around the concept of Significant 
Market Power (SMP), explicitly equated to dominance under Art. 82 EU Treaty. 
The Commission has initially segmented the telecoms and media sector into a 
number of pre-defined relevant markets, which National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) used as a default list of markets warranting ex ante regulation whenever 
SMP players are found to be existing.  
                                                   
61  Vertical agreements between ISPs and ICPs, where the ISP’s market share does not exceed 
30%, would fall under the Block Exemption regulation 2790/1999 for vertical restraints, and 
as such would not be challenged by antitrust laws if a number of conditions are met (for 
example, the duration of the agreement should be less than 5 years). 
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Net neutrality mostly deals with cases in which there is SMP in the retail 
broadband market62. The list of markets provided by the Commission 2003 
Recommendation, however, did not contain any retail broadband market. In 
November 2007, the Commission shortened the list by eliminating almost all 
retail markets, but kept a revised (and broader) version of the retail fixed-line 
market (market 1). This market does not coincide with retail broadband access, 
but the latter market could always be identified and defined by a NRA. If this is 
the case, under the 2002 regulatory framework ISPs notified as SMP players are 
automatically subject to remedies that are sufficient to tackle net neutrality 
concerns, including non-discrimination obligations, mandatory access and price 
control. 
Even when no SMP is found, the current regulatory framework allows for the 
imposition of remedies under article 5 of the Access Directive: in particular, 
whenever end-to-end connectivity is jeopardised, NRAs can decide to mandate 
network interconnection to operators that control access to end-users. In 
addition, as regards content, access to specific digital radio and television 
broadcasting services can be mandated at fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) prices by NRAs if needed.  
If no such market definition is reached by the NRA, then the matter will be left 
to ex post competition policy. This is a likely – and desirable – outcome, since a 
systematic application of remedies on dominant ISPs would hardly match the 
economics of net neutrality, according to which real competition problems may 
arise only under some, rather specific circumstances. In Wanadoo, the 
Commission has already clarified that activities in the retail broadband market 
pertain to the realm of antitrust scrutiny, more than to the one of ex ante sector-
specific regulation63.  
3.2.1 The current proposal 
Faced with a mounting debate, the European Commission has sought to clarify 
its approach to network neutrality in the recently proposed review of the e-
communications regulatory framework in place since 2003. In particular, the 
Commission proposes to: 
• Amend article 22 of the Universal Service Directive to allow NRAs to 
intervene and set minimum QoS standards whenever ISPs degrade quality 
to an unacceptable level, “thereby frustrating the delivery of services from 
third parties”64. 
• Amend article 20 of the same Directive by allowing member states to 
impose obligations of transparency, according to which end users have to be 
                                                   
62  Hou et al. (2008) 
63  See COMP/38.233, Wanadoo Interactive, 16 July 2003. 
64  The technical implementation of minimal QoS is still uncertain, and certainly does not lend 
itself to any “one-size-fits-all” solution. Accordingly, the Commission would have to study the 
matter in depth and possibly issue guidance for NRAs on how to define and monitor “minimal 
QoS” provisions. 
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clearly informed of whatever limitation imposed by their ISP on their ability 
to access any content and/or run any lawful application or service of their 
choice. 
The Commission also clarifies in several passages of its impact assessment 
document that product differentiation through traffic prioritisation and network 
management can, in general, open up new opportunities for ICPs, increasing 
choice for consumers. As in all markets, investments to differentiate products 
and increase service quality and variety cannot be seen with disfavour, unless 
they lead to a reduction in customer choice and welfare. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposals appear meaningful, as they address the only “hole” in the 
available remedies at EU level – both regulation and antitrust.  
However, the European Parliament is reportedly working on further 
amendments to the Universal Service Directive, which would introduce more 
rigid rules favouring net neutrality65. Whether this preludes to a new wave of 
neutrality proposals, it remains to be seen. This paper has shown that such a 
move would be, at best, ill-advised.  
3.2.2 Potential refinements 
Even when competition law or sectoral regulation is applied to challenge 
behaviour by an ISP, this does not mean that the remedy should consist in 
reverting to fully “neutral” Internet, i.e. no traffic management. To the contrary, 
EU institutions may develop a set of remedies that could be applied in case 
market facts suggest the need to intervene. One such remedy could be 
prohibiting some forms of network management (e.g. shaping traffic according 
to the type of application) and allowing only protocol-agnostic network 
management (i.e. based on volume of traffic, not on type of traffic). Such a 
remedy, when needed, would still preserve the possibility, for ISPs, to manage 
their networks and provide each user with the best possible experience at a 
reasonable price66. But absent evidence of a market failure, it would still be ill-
advised to mandate it as the only possible way of shaping traffic.  
Another possible refinement could be the adoption of a document setting policy 
principles that will be applied in the years to come, similar to the FCC’s 2005 
Internet Policy statement. At European level, this document would take the 
form of a Commission communication, which would not bound NRAs and 
national governments, but would represent a key reference for all industry 
players and regulators in European member states. The forthcoming 
                                                   
65  Already in the Trautmann report approved by the Parliament in July 2008, and which still 
does not address the Universal Service Directive, one of the key objectives of the regulatory 
framework has been changed: instead of “ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of 
competition in the electronic communications sector, in particular for the delivery of 
content”, the Parliament added “the delivery and access to content and services across all 
networks”. 
66  Time Warner Cable said it will launch a service that charges new consumers of high-speed 
Internet service based on their usage. Broadband subscribers in Beaumont, Texas, will be 
charged $1 per gigabyte above monthly allowances. 
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Commission communication on NGNs may already contain some of these useful 
indications.  
4 Conclusion: A “holistic view” on net neutrality 
The debate on net neutrality has dominated the scene for years in the US, but 
the claims of net neutrality advocates appear to be often missing the target in 
economic terms. As recalled by Tim Berners Lee on several occasions, network 
management and discrimination have always been a feature of the Internet, and 
at least some forms of discrimination and product differentiation are the very 
basis on which the whole “netiquette” is built. The fragile grounds on which 
mandatory net neutrality is built becomes even more evident, if one looks at 
how neutrality champions behave in their own markets: why should 
discrimination patterns and preferential lanes be allowed in higher layers, but 
not at the physical layer? From this viewpoint, claims of net neutrality appear 
more like the echo of a “NIMBY” syndrome – with players claiming that the 
Internet should be left open, but never mentioning their own markets.  
This paper has shown that mandatory net neutrality is a competition and 
investment problem, not a regulatory issue. On the one hand, net neutrality 
seriously affects the degree and phenomenology of competition at the different 
layer of the value chain, and prevents ISPs from concluding both desirable and 
– in some cases – undesirable transactions with IAPs and ICPs. At the same 
time, competition affects neutrality, since the existence of strongly competitive 
markets at all layers of the value chain is likely to encourage ISPs to open up 
their networks and manage traffic more effectively, striking the most efficient 
balance between traffic shaping and network openness. This is a very well-
known story after two decades of information revolution: many industries 
evolved from proprietary to more open architectures, as their basic technology 
becomes more mature. But without the possibility of establishing privileged 
links between complementary products, modular innovations such as the 
iTunes-FairPlay-iPod system would never have reached the market67. 
From the rationale exposed in previous sections, it also follows that the 
regulatory approach to net neutrality makes a real difference when it comes to 
incentives to invest in NGNs. Suffice it to say that: 
• Those who invest in high-speed broadband platforms (especially if this 
includes network investment) reportedly do it to differentiate their products 
from competing ones; 
• As already recalled, under mandatory network neutrality obligations ISPs 
would not be able to reach an optimal pricing structure, since they can charge 
only one side of the platform. 
                                                   
67  See Poel, Renda and Ballon (2007). iTunes, with a proprietary architecture, now faces 
competition from products with semi-open architectures (e.g. DRM 10), and its users demand 
more openness, forcing Apple to revise constantly its DRM FairPlay. Likewise, the history of 
the PC industry testifies of modular architectures gradually been opened up to competition.  
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• In addition, the impossibility to price discriminate reduces (better, eliminate) 
the extent to which ISPs can appropriate part of the surplus generated by 
exchanges on their platforms for IAPs and ICPs. 
Therefore, under mandatory net neutrality, ISPs would have very little 
incentives to invest in new digital platforms: as a matter of fact, they would have 
to cope with end users’ own demand elasticity, and with the impossibility to 
charge IAPs/ICPs that use the ISP’s network to reap enormous profits in 
exchanges with consumers. It doesn’t take an experienced venture capitalist to 
conclude that an investment in infrastructure would be, to say the least, ill-
advised. 
The problem is even more delicate if approached from a “holistic” perspective: if 
the approach to net neutrality is coupled with the impact of other policies, the 
right “policy mix” can be more effectively identified. In the case of Europe, the 
fact that regulatory holidays are not considered to be an option to be pursued by 
NRAs and national government will arguably trigger service-based competition 
at the physical layer; given this regulatory approach at the physical layer, 
mandating net neutrality at higher layers would simply mean depriving ISPs of 
any incentive to invest in NGNs: they would not be able to draw significant 
revenues from wholesale access, nor from QoS fees, nor from access prices to 
consumers. The existing approach to regulation at the infrastructure layer – 
including the current discussion of functional separation as a potential remedy 
available to NRAs – is another important reason why Europe should not 
proceed in the direction of mandatory net neutrality.  
In summary, mandatory net neutrality significantly distorts intra- and inter-
platform competition, hampers optimal pricing structures by ISPs, reduces 
demand for NGNs by end users, allows for free riding by IAPs and ICP on ISPs’ 
investment costs, and consequently stifles incentives to invest in NGNs by 
network owners. But perhaps one of the most undesirable (and probably 
unintended) consequences of net neutrality regulation is that it would not only 
hamper harmful conduct, but also many efficient transactions between ISPs and 
IAPs/ICPs, which would redistribute the cost of new broadband platforms in a 
more sustainable way between all users of new platforms68. Such a solution 
would thus amount, in a word, to throwing the baby with the bath water. In the 
attempt to solve a potential problem, regulators would end up devising a cure 
that is much worse than the alleged disease.  
For this reason, the solution originally devised by the European Commission – 
based on the provision of sufficient information to end users – seems to be the 
right, light-touch approach to a problem that remains more theoretical than 
                                                   
68  For example, Ford, Koutski and Spiwak (2007) conclude that “consumers would pay higher 
prices, the profits of the broadband service provider would decline, and the sales of Internet 
content providers would also decline. Moreover, rules that prohibit the market from 
contracting efficiently may shift sales from content providers to the broadband provider’s 
content affiliate, a result entirely inconsistent with the stated desire of network neutrality 
proponents. As the model shows, these unintended consequences of such network neutrality 
rules are the result of shifting costs to consumers that are more efficiently borne in the 
exchange between content and broadband providers”. 
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practical. This approach, echoed also by the FCC in its recent judgment on 
Comcast, should be endorsed also by the European Parliament, without 
indulging in more pro-neutrality stances that, at the end of the story, are not in 
the interest of end users69.  
                                                   
69 See the FCC’s press release of 1 August 2008, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-284286A1.pdf. 
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other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.
